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The God Exclusion
THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF
PROSELYTIZATION AND RELIGIOUS
DISCRIMINATION IN THE U.S. MILITARY
Over the past several years, there has been increasing
concern among the general public about religious discrimination
and proselytization1 in the U.S. Military.2 Complaints about
religious bias in the military have centered mostly on the
proselytizing efforts of evangelical Christian soldiers and the
pressure they have exerted on their nonevangelical counterparts
to conform to Evangelical Christian ideals.3 These incidents are
not uncommon. From 2005 to 2007, the Pentagon received fifty
complaints of religious bias in the military.4 Other sources,
however, maintain that religious discrimination is much more
pervasive,5 placing the number of complaints for that time period
at 11,000 or higher.6
Claims of religious discrimination and proselytization in
the military are the result of a variety of actors. At the center of
the controversy is the military chaplaincy,7 an institution
designed to minister to the religious needs of soldiers.8 Although
1

Proselytization means to convert someone to one’s own religious faith.
AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1119 (4th ed. 2000).
2
For the purposes of this note, the Military includes the Army, Navy, Air
Force, Coast Guard, and any other unit organized under the Department of Defense.
Major (ret.) David E. Fitzkee & Captain Linell A. Letendre, Religion in the Military:
Navigating the Channel Between the Religion Clauses, 59 A.F. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007); Ira
C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Instruments of Accommodation: The Military Chaplaincy
and the Constitution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 89, 90 (2007).
3
Heather Cook, Service Before Self? Evangelicals Flying High at the U.S.
Air Force Academy, 36 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 1 (2007); John Milburn, Soldiers Pressured into
Christianity, MOBILE PRESS-REGISTER (Mobile, Ala.), Dec. 29, 2007, at D5, available at
2007 WLNR 25804393.
4
Eric Lichtblau, Questions Raised Anew About Religion in Military, N.Y.
TIMES, March 1, 2009, at A14, available at 2009 WLNR 3930224.
5
Id.
6
Religion News Service, LONG BEACH PRESS-TELEGRAM, May 5, 2009, at U5,
available at 2009 WLNR 8867290.
7
Steven H. Aden, The Navy’s Perfect Storm: Has a Military Chaplaincy
Forfeited Its Constitutional Legitimacy by Establishing Denominational Preferences?,
31 W. ST. U. L. REV 185, 187 (2004); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 90.
8
Aden, supra note 7, at 186-87.
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the chaplaincy program is per se constitutional,9 chaplains have
drawn criticism for allegedly overstepping their statutorily
defined duties.10 Another source of controversy is high-ranking
military officials. In 2006, seven officers, including four generals,
appeared in uniform to fund-raise for an evangelical Bible-study
group.11 Other complaints involve institutional discrimination.
For instance, at the Air Force Academy, Christian cadets
attending off-campus Sunday services or Bible study are given
passes that do not count as leave, but non-Christian soldiers
who worship on other days of the week must take leave to attend
religious services.12 Religious discrimination and proselytization
also find a home in peer interaction. According to one complaint,
“soldiers who are open about their non-belief can face
harassment and ostracizing from fellow troops.”13
Behind the public debate about religion’s role in the
military, these claims implicate a complex array of
constitutional issues. As an entity regulated by Congress,14 the
military is subject to the limitations imposed by the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which states that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”15 This phrase
encompasses the Constitution’s two religion clauses, the
Establishment Clause16 and the Free Exercise Clause.17
Proselytization in the military implicates such complex
constitutional issues due, in part, to the inherent difficulty of
delineating clear legal rules from the religion clauses.18 This
difficulty is exacerbated by the long history of affording judicial
deference to the military.19
This note analyzes how Establishment Clause
jurisprudence has developed to deal with contemporary issues
9

Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985).
Aden, supra note 7, at 187.
11
Neela Banerjee, Solider Sues Army, Saying His Atheism Led to Threats,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2008, at A14, available at 2008 WLNR 7760637.
12
Cook, supra note 3, at 6.
13
Kay Campbell, Atheists Wonder if Fellow Troops Have Their Backs, MOBILE
PRESS-REGISTER (Mobile, Ala.), Oct. 20, 2007, at D1, available at 2007 WLNR 21287415.
14
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, 13.
15
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
16
Id. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .”).
17
Id. (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].”).
18
Major Michael J. Benjamin, Justice, Justice Shall You Pursue: Legal
Analysis of Religion Issues in the Army, ARMY LAW., Nov. 1998, at 1, 3.
19
Stephen Lewis Rabinowitz, Goldman v. Secretary of Defense: Restricting
the Religious Rights of Military Servicemembers, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 881, 897 (1985).
10
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of religious discrimination in the military. Part I provides
background information on contemporary military life. In
particular, it details some of the formal and informal
complaints of religious discrimination and proselytization in
the military. Part I also discusses the military culture of
conformity and argues that strict adherence to military
regulations and a hierarchical chain of command make military
life inherently coercive. Part II analyzes the Establishment
Clause standards developed by the Supreme Court. Part III
examines the Establishment Clause in the context of the
Constitution’s other religion clause, the Free Exercise Clause.
In particular, Part III discusses the constitutionality of the
military chaplaincy as an institution and seeks to define
proselytization in the context of the Constitution’s two religion
clauses. Part IV analyzes the current state of Establishment
Clause controversies in the military by examining the alleged
perpetrators
of
religious
discrimination
and
the
constitutionality of their conduct.
Ultimately, this note argues that religious discrimination
and proselytization in the military should be analyzed under the
Establishment Clause using what is commonly referred to as the
coercion test. Under the coercion test, if the alleged incidents of
religious discrimination and proselytization are true, the U.S.
Military has violated the Establishment Clause and should take
measures to cure the constitutional deficiency. Appropriate
remedial measures include the institution and enforcement of
nondiscrimination policies as well as institutional assurance
that soldiers will not be subjected to proselytizing by fellow
soldiers or superior officers.
I.

RELIGION IN THE MILITARY ENVIRONMENT

The constitutional implications of proselytization and
religious discrimination in the U.S. Military are of particular
importance because contemporary controversies have become
ubiquitous. The proliferation of these complaints is particularly
troubling when one considers the inherently coercive nature of
military life.
A.

Alleged Incidents of Misconduct

The contemporary controversy about religion’s role in
the U.S. Military results in part from publicity garnered by
lawsuits against the Department of Defense (DOD) and the
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U.S. Air Force (USAF). In 2007, Specialist Jeremy Hall, at that
time an active member of the U.S. Army and deployed in Iraq,
filed suit against the DOD and his superior officer, Major
Freddy Welborn.20 The lawsuit sought injunctive relief from a
pattern and practice of promoting religion in the Army.21 Hall
alleged that he was discriminated against because he is an
atheist.22 In his complaint, Hall claimed that on Thanksgiving
Day 2006, he was castigated by a superior officer and
ostracized by his peers because he chose not to participate in a
premeal Christian prayer.23 Hall also stated that Major
Welborn threatened to bring charges against him under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice and to bar him from reenlistment because he had organized and participated in
atheist meetings.24 In a sworn statement, Hall claimed that
Major Welborn told him, “People like you are not holding up
the Constitution and are going against what the founding
fathers, who were Christian, wanted for America!”25 Specialist
Hall also informally complained that “soldiers who are open
about their non-belief can face harassment and ostracizing
from fellow troops . . . .”26 In fact, Hall alleged that he received
threats of “fragging” (attempts to wound or kill a fellow soldier
by throwing a grenade or similar explosive)27 in response to his
organization of atheists.28
In addition to Specialist Hall’s complaint against the
DOD, there have been widespread allegations of religious
discrimination and proselytization in the USAF and at the
USAF Academy.29 One of the most prominent incidents of
religious intolerance involves the USAF Academy head football
coach, who allegedly draped a banner in the team locker room
20

Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Military Religious Freedom Found.
v. Gates, No. 07-2444-JWL (D. Kan., filed Sept. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Hall Complaint].
21
Injunctive relief was partially sought pursuant to the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution. Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Banerjee, supra note 11 (Major Welborn contends that the contents of
Hall’s complaint are false. Nevertheless, Hall, now with a different unit, claims that
backlash against him have continued. Since the filing of the complaint, one sergeant
has physically threatened Hall and another sergeant allegedly told Hall that he was
“not entitled to religious freedom because he had no religion at all.”).
26
Campbell, supra note 13.
27
John Ayto, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF SLANG 103 (Oxford Univ. Press 1998).
28
Campbell, supra note 13.
29
Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 2, at 3.
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that read, “I am a Christian first and last, I am a member of
Team Jesus.”30 Despite the negative publicity garnered by this
action, the football coach publically affirmed his position,
stating that “[r]eligion is what we’re all about at the
Academy.”31 Further examples of religious discrimination and
proselytization at the USAF Academy include an alleged
incident in which a history professor required students to pray
before allowing them to begin a final exam,32 and, more
generally, the ostracizing of cadets who chose not to attend
chapel services.33 These are only a few examples of what has
been described as the Academy’s general preference for
Christians over non-Christians.34
In 2005, after growing frustrated with the USAF’s
reaction to informal complaints of religious discrimination,
Michael Weinstein, a former USAF Academy cadet, filed an
action against the USAF.35 Weinstein sought permanent
injunctive relief so that “[n]o member of the USAF, including a
chaplain, [would be] permitted to evangelize, proselytize, or in
any related way attempt to involuntarily convert, pressure,
exhort, or persuade a fellow member of the USAF to accept
their own religious beliefs while on duty.”36 The lawsuit alleged
a “severe, systematic, and pervasive” pattern of religious
discrimination.37 Thus, like the Hall complaint, the Weinstein
complaint charged that religious discrimination had become
institutionalized.38 In particular, the lawsuit alleged, among
other things, that cadets were encouraged by chaplains to
convert fellow cadets, that cadets were forced to participate in
nonsecular prayers at Academy events, that non-Christian and
nonreligious cadets were persistently harassed with slurs, and
that during Basic Cadet Training, an Air Force chaplain once

30

Cook, supra note 3, at 8.
Id.
32
Id. at 7.
33
Id. at 6.
34
See generally id. at 6-8; Banerjee, supra note 11; Milburn, supra note 3.
35
Amended Complaint for Violation of Constitutional Rights para. 30,
Weinstein v. U.S. Air Force, No. CIV-05-1064 JP/LAM (D.N.M. Oct. 31, 2005)
[hereinafter Weinstein Complaint]. The suit has been dismissed without prejudice as to
Weinstein, but an appeal is likely. Cook, supra note 3, at 1 n.1.
36
Weinstein Complaint, supra note 35, para. 18.
37
Id.
38
Cook, supra note 3, at 1; Kenneth J. Schweiker, Military Chaplains:
Federally Funded Fanaticism and the United States Air Force Academy, 8 RUTGERS
J.L. & RELIGION, Fall 2006, at 14-15.
31
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told cadets that if they refused to proselytize, they would “burn
in the fires of hell.”39
Although much of the controversy about religion in the
military has focused on the Hall and Weinstein complaints, and
on activity at the USAF Academy, additional allegations
suggest a widespread problem. For example, nine midshipmen
of the U.S. Naval Academy have lobbied to eliminate
mandatory lunchtime prayer at the Naval Academy.40 The DOD
has also come under fire for allowing two fundamentalist
Christian organizations exclusive access to several military
bases.41 One soldier claimed that, upon returning from a tour of
duty in Iraq, he was forced to attend “a ceremony that began
and ended with a Christian prayer.”42 More recently, a soldier
complained that his unit was forced to choose between
attending a Christian rock concert or cleaning their barracks.43
Complaints about religious discrimination and proselytization
in the U.S. Military thus implicate a broad spectrum of
military personnel and institutions.
B.

Coercive Nature of the Military

Complaints about religious discrimination and
proselytization in the military are particularly disquieting
considering the unique nature of military life. Courts have
consistently recognized that “[t]he military constitutes a
specialized community governed by a separate discipline from
that of the civilian.”44 One of the principal ways military life
differs from civilian life is that unit cohesiveness is achieved
through socialization—a policy of each branch of the U.S.

39

Weinstein Complaint, supra note 35, paras. 14-17, 19.
Religion’s Place in Annapolis, VA. PILOT & LEDGER STAR, June 30, 2008,
available at 2008 WLNR 12258162. The lunchtime prayer is a tradition that involves a
chaplain leading grace. Although midshipmen are not required to pray, all midshipmen
must stand and bow their heads during the pre-meal ritual. Josh Mitchell, Mealtime
Prayer Again Under Fire—ACLU Threatens to Take Legal Action Against Academy,
BALT. SUN, June 26, 2008, at 1A, available at 2008 WLNR 11998565.
41
Is it Legal? Church and State, 57 NEWSLETTER ON INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM
24, Jan. 1, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 8924032.
42
Lichtblau, supra note 4.
43
Steve Szkotak, Troops: Skipping Christian Concert Got Us Punished,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 20, 2010, available at http://huffingtonpost.com/2010/08/21/
troops-skipping-christian_n_690032.html.
44
Anderson v. Laird, 437 F.2d 912, 914 (7th Cir. 1971) (quoting Orloff v.
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953)); accord Cook, supra note 3, at 14.
40
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Military.45 For example, “service before self” is a core concept at
the USAF.46 This model requires that personal interests be
subordinate to USAF regulations.47 The Virginia Military
Institute (VMI) has a comparable philosophy. There, first-year
cadets are collectively rewarded when one cadet contributes to
VMI objectives and collectively punished when one cadet
detracts from those objectives.48 Similarly, the U.S. Army aims
for a common ethical and moral base throughout its units.49
Military socialization is thus built on the notion that each
solider is part of a larger unit.50 This ideal is epitomized in the
U.S. Army’s former slogan, “An Army of One.”51
A key facet of military socialization is strict adherence to
codes of conduct.52 Each branch of the U.S. Military institutes its
own regulations. In the Army, for instance, all soldiers must
adhere to exacting uniform and grooming standards.53
Regulations are also in place at military colleges and
universities. At the USAF Academy, codes of conduct structure
almost every aspect of a cadet’s life.54 For example, all cadets
must dine at the Academy mess hall; cadets are required to
spend Saturday mornings studying; and first-year cadets are not
allowed to wear civilian clothing without approval from their
Commandant—even when on leave or on the weekend.55
Similarly, codes and regulations control what cadets at VMI do
most hours of the day.56 In particular, cadets at VMI are required
to regularly participate in drills and to join in traditional dining
ceremonies, and first-year cadets are subjected to hazing
rituals.57 The implicit message articled by these rules is that

45

William J. Dobosh, Jr., Coercion in the Ranks: The Establishment Clause
Implications of Chaplain-Led Prayers at Mandatory Army Events, 2006 WIS. L. REV.
1493, 1522.
46
Cook, supra note 3, at 14.
47
Id.
48
Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 361 (4th Cir. 2003).
49
Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1524.
50
Id. at 1526.
51
Captain Eugene Y. Kim, The Judge Advocate Recruiting Office: The
Gateway to Service, ARMY LAW., June 2004, at 38.
52
Cook, supra note 3, at 14.
53
Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1526.
54
Cook, supra note 3, at 14.
55
Id. at 14-15.
56
Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 361-63 (4th Cir. 2003).
57
Id.
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deviation is not tolerated. “In this strictly regimented world, . . .
debate, dissent, and deliberation have no place.”58
The types of military regulations previously mentioned
are primarily enforced through a hierarchical chain of
command. Socialization teaches soldiers to obey the commands
of their authority figures.59 This process trains soldiers to
respect institutional leadership and discourages soldiers from
challenging authority.60 This culture of conformity is
continually reinforced by military leaders, who are expected to
persistently convey and promote military values to their
subordinates.61 While this type of indoctrination may ultimately
develop unit cohesiveness, mandated adherence to regimented
codes of conduct raises the issue of voluntariness. To be sure,
enlistment in the various branches of the U.S. Military is done
by choice. But the decision to enlist does not eliminate the
possibility of coercion while serving in the military.62 As the
Supreme Court has recognized, “[P]eer group pressure to
conform to established practices is a forceful form of coercion.”63
Voluntary participation in military activities is thus
circumscribed by the coercion inherent in the military’s chain
of command structure.64 Subordinates have no real ability to
tell their commanding officer they are not interested in obeying
that commander’s orders.65 This dynamic magnifies the risk of
coerced religious activity and government-enforced preference
for certain religions or religion generally.66
II.

ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE

The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution states that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion.”67 Eleven years after its
ratification, Thomas Jefferson famously articled the notion that
the First Amendment establishes a “wall of . . . separation

58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1525.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
Id. at 296.
Schweiker, supra note 38, at 36.
Id.
Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1528.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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between church and state.”68 Although seemingly absolute in its
terms, there are few areas of constitutional law that are as
complex as those implicated by the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment.69 In fact, as Chief Justice Burger wrote,
“[W]e can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this
extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law. . . . Total
separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some
relationship between government and religious organizations is
inevitable.”70 This inherent line-drawing difficulty is
exacerbated in the military context because courts often defer
to military policies that purport to “enhance military readiness
and promote national safety.”71
The Establishment Clause is typically implicated when
the government takes action that is perceived to help or
advance religion.72 The overarching idea is that the government
may not favor one religion over another or generally favor
religion over nonreligion; rather, a government stance on
religion must be neutral.73 To that end, the Supreme Court has
established three tests for Establishment Clause controversies.
A.

The Lemon Test

The Supreme Court established the predominant
Establishment Clause standard in Lemon v. Kurtzman.74 In
Lemon, the Court emphasized that there are “[t]hree main evils
against which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford
protection: ‘sponsorship, financial support, and active
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.’”75 To
safeguard against these types of government intrusion, the
Court articulated a conjunctive three-prong test. Under the
68

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Ass’n of Conn. (Jan.
1, 1802) (on file with the Thomas Jefferson Papers at the Library of Congress),
available at http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/religion/danburys.jpg.
69
Benjamin, supra note 18, at 3; Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1499.
70
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612, 614 (1971).
71
Aden, supra note 7, at 196; Rabinowitz, supra note 19, at 897.
72
Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 2, at 8.
73
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (“The touchstone for
our analysis is the principle that the ‘First Amendment mandates governmental
neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.’”
(quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968))).
74
Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 233 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)). The Lemon decision struck down Rhode Island and
Pennsylvania statutes that provided state subsidization of private-school (including
parochial-school) teachers’ salaries. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-07.
75
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
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Lemon test, a law or governmental action that is religiously
neutral on its face does not violate the Establishment Clause if
(1) it has a secular purpose,76 (2) its principal or primary effect
is one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,77 and (3) it
does not foster an excessive government entanglement with
religion.78 A challenged action or law is constitutional only if all
three prongs are satisfied.79
76

Id. at 612-13. The first prong of the Lemon Test, whether there is a secular
purpose, involves an inquiry into the subjective intentions of the government or
government agent. Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.2d 355, 372 (4th Cir. 2003). The Supreme
Court has held that purpose is determined by looking at the text of the statute or
government action at issue as an “objective observer.” McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545
U.S. 844, 863 (2005) (quoting Santa Fe Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000)).
If there is more than one legitimate purpose, one of which is not secular, the analysis
shifts to what the primary or predominant purpose is. Id. at 860 (“When the
government acts with the ostensible and predominant purpose of advancing religion, it
violates that central Establishment Clause value of official religious neutrality, there
being no neutrality when the government’s ostensible object is to take sides.”); see also
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 593 (1987). That said, singular, or even multiple,
“purposes” are difficult to ascertain. See McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 863. As a result,
courts are typically deferential to a state’s asserted secular purpose and it is usually
only when a government’s stated purpose is found to be a sham or the law or action at
issue is explicitly religious that it is overturned. Emilie Kraft Bindon, Entangled
Choices: Selecting Chaplains for the United States Military, 56 ALA. L. REV. 247, 261-62
(2004). The first prong of the Lemon Test is therefore a relatively low hurdle to
overcome. Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 2, at 9 (noting that the Supreme Court has
invalidated governmental action for improper purpose under the Establishment Clause
in only five cases since Lemon was decided in 1971).
77
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. The second prong, whether the principle or
primary effect is one that advances or inhibits religion, is arguably “the most
significant part of the Lemon test” and is often “the crux” of an Establishment Clause
controversy. Fitzkee & Letendre, supra note 2, at 10. Unlike the determination of
whether there is a secular purpose, analysis of the “effects” prong is an objective
determination that measures “whether, irrespective of government’s actual purpose,
the practice under review . . . conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval.”
Mellen, 327 F.3d at 374 (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985)). This prong
ostensibly targets statutes or government action whose primary or predominant effect
advances religion but whose purpose could not otherwise be identified. The “effects”
prong does not, however, target statutes or government action whose secondary or
tertiary effect incidentally advances religion, Fitzkee & Linell, supra note 2, at 10,
because the Supreme Court’s holdings “do not call for a total separation between
church and state,” Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614.
78
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. The third and final prong of the Lemon Test,
whether government action has fostered an excessive entanglement with religion, looks
at the extent to which government intrudes into church matters or to the extent to
which government allows religious entities to influence governmental matters. Fitzkee
& Linell, supra note 2, at 10. Because there cannot be an absolute separation of church
and state, government entanglement exists on a spectrum, “with some entanglements
. . . more egregious than others.” Bindon, supra note 76, at 263. Thus, in evaluating
whether there is an excessive entanglement with religion, courts take a comprehensive
approach and examine such factors as “the character and purposes of the institutions
that are benefited [and] the nature of the . . . resulting relationship between the
government and the religious authority.” Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615. The Supreme Court
has “permitted the States to provide church-related schools with secular, neutral, or
nonideological services, facilities, or materials. Bus transportation, school lunches,
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The Lemon test has been widely criticized since Lemon
was decided in 197180—even by members of the Supreme
Court.81 In fact, the Court has explicitly declined to limit
Establishment Clause controversies to a single standard.82 In
the years since Lemon was decided, the Supreme Court has
applied other tests in Establishment Clause controversies.83
And in some instances, the Court has ignored the Lemon test
altogether.84 Nevertheless, Lemon has yet to be overturned.85
B.

The Endorsement Test

The Supreme Court clouded the waters of
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in 1989, when it decided
County of Allegheny v. ACLU. At issue in that case was the
constitutionality of two different holiday displays, a crèche and
a menorah, located on public property.86 The Court framed the
issue of constitutionality as whether the government had
appeared to have taken a position on questions of religious
belief.87 The Court emphasized that “whether the key word is
endorsement, favoritism, or promotion,” the essential
Establishment Clause principle is the same.88
public health services, and secular textbooks supplied in common to all students [have
been held] not . . . to offend the Establishment Clause.” Id. at 616-17.
79
Fitzkee & Linell, supra note 2, at 8-9.
80
See, e.g., Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 236 (6th Cir. 1997);
Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1502; Fitzkee & Linell, supra note 2, at 11.
81
One example is Justice Rehnquist who wrote in a dissenting opinion to
Wallace v. Jaffree that the Lemon test “has no more grounding in the history of the First
Amendment than does the wall theory upon which it rests.” Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 110
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 900 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 712 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
82
Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 233 (2d Cir. 1985).
83
See Lee v. Weisman 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Cnty.
of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
84
See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
85
See McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 859 (“Ever since Lemon v. Kurtzman
summarized the three familiar considerations for evaluating Establishment Clause
claims, looking to whether government action has ‘a secular legislative purpose’ has
been a common, albeit seldom dispositive, element of our cases.”).
86
Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 579, 588.
87
Id. at 594.
88
Id. at 593 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under that standard, the
Court held that the crèche was unconstitutional because, standing alone inside the main
entrance of the county courthouse, it had an unmistakably clear religious meaning. Id. at
598. On the other hand, the Court held that the display of the menorah was
constitutional. Id. at 614. Unlike the crèche, which stood alone, the eighteen-foot
menorah was displayed with a forty-five-foot Christmas tree. Id. at. 617. The Court thus
reasoned that the dual-display failed to give the appearance that the county was taking a
position on anything other than the secular celebration of the winter holidays. Id. at 616.
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The crux of this new analysis—known today as the
endorsement test—is whether a reasonable and informed
observer would view the government’s action as an endorsement
of religion.89 In fashioning this additional Establishment Clause
standard, the Court’s main concern was that the endorsement of
any one religion would effectively elevate its members to an
“insider” status90 while relegating nonadherents to the position of
secondary citizens.91 Thus, if government has endorsed one
religion over another—or, more generally, religion over
nonreligion—it has violated the principle of neutrality that is
fundamental to the Establishment Clause.92 Many courts,
however, view the endorsement test as a mere refinement of the
Lemon test’s “effects” prong.93 Others have chosen to ignore the
endorsement test altogether and have continued to use the
Lemon standard.94
C.

The Coercion Test

Although the majority opinion in County of Allegheny is
famous for its adaption of a new constitutional standard,
Justice Kennedy’s opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, is also significant. Kennedy reasoned that coercion is
central to any Establishment Clause analysis because it would
be difficult for government to “establish a religion without
some measure of more or less subtle coercion, be it in the form
of taxation to supply the substantial benefits that would
sustain a state-established faith, direct compulsion to
observance, or governmental exhortation to religiosity that
amounts in fact to proselytizing.”95 Kennedy concluded that
“[a]bsent coercion, the risk of infringement of religious liberty
by passive or symbolic accommodation is minimal.”96

89

Fitzkee & Linell, supra note 2, at 12.
Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1503-04.
91
Id. at 1504.
92
Id.
93
See, e.g., Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 371 (4th Cir. 2003); Cook, supra
note 3, at 19; see also Fitzkee & Linell, supra note 2, at 12 (noting that some courts
have questioned whether the endorsements test is part of the Lemon analysis); Deanna
N. Pihos, Assuming Maturity Matters: The Limited Reach of the Establishment Clause
at Public Universities, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1349, 1357 (2005).
94
See Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 986 (7th Cir. 1997); Chaudhuri v.
Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 233 (6th Cir. 1997).
95
Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659-60 (1989).
96
Id. at 662.
90
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In 1992, the Supreme Court formally adopted Justice
Kennedy’s coercion analysis in Lee v. Weisman.97 That case
shifted the focus of Establishment Clause jurisprudence with
respect to school prayer and introduced what is now commonly
known as the coercion test.98 The issue in Lee was whether a
graduation ceremony at a Rhode Island middle school violated
the Establishment Clause because the benediction and
invocation, which were led by a rabbi, had religious content.99
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, stated that there “are
heightened concerns with protecting freedom of conscience from
subtle coercive pressure in elementary and public schools.”100 The
Lee Court was particularly concerned that, given the students’
ages and the social pressure to attend graduation, there was no
real alternative to standing and listening to the religious
speech.101 Although the pressure was both subtle and indirect, it
was also “as real as any overt compulsion.”102
Despite Justice Kennedy’s belief that coercion is an
essential element of all Establishment Clause controversies,
the Lee holding was explicitly limited to primary and secondary
education.103 In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, an
example of an application of the coercion test, the Court struck
down a Texas public school district’s policy of using student
referenda to decide whether religious prayers would be
included at graduation and before football games.104 Although
the prayers in Santa Fe were chosen by students—unlike Lee
where the school superintendant had decided the prayer
97

505 U.S. 577, 579 (1992).
Prior to the introduction of the coercion test, the Supreme Court had
consistently held that organized and official prayer at schools violates the
Establishment Clause. Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1507. In 1962, the Supreme Court in
Engel v. Vitale struck down a requirement that New York public school students recite
a religious prayer at the start of each school day. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). The next year,
the Court struck down a Pennsylvania statute requiring daily Bible reading at the
beginning of the school day. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963). The common thread of these cases was the Court’s concern that prayer was an
official part of the public school curriculum. Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1508. The Court
denied the opportunity to overturn Lemon because the issue before the Court could be
decided outside the Lemon framework. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
99
The invocation started, “God of the Free, Hope of the Brave.” The
benediction began, “O God, we are grateful to You . . . .” and ended, “We give thanks to
You, Lord . . . .” Lee, 505 U.S. at 580-82 (1992).
100
Id. at 592.
101
Id. at 593. “[A]bsence would require forfeiture of those intangible benefits
which have motivated the student through youth and all her high school years.” Id. at 595.
102
Id. at 593.
103
Id.
104
530 U.S. 290 (2000).
98

820

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:2

policy—the Court found this distinction constitutionally
insignificant.105 In both cases, the school prayer had the
“improper effect of coercing those present to participate in an
act of religious worship.”106 Since Lee, the Supreme Court has
upheld all state-sponsored religious activities in nonprimary
and nonsecondary schools.
1. Prayer at Public Universities
Consistent with the Supreme Court’s limitation of the
Lee holding, two federal courts have upheld formal prayers
during public university graduations. In Tanford v. Brand, the
Seventh Circuit rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to
Indiana University’s invocation and benediction at
graduation.107 The dispositive issue for the Tanford court was
that the students were adults, rather than younger students,
and that attendance at the ceremony was not at all
compulsory.108 The Sixth Circuit adopted a similar stance in
Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, where a Tennessee State University
faculty member challenged the use of prayer and moments of
silence at university events.109 Echoing the reasoning of
Tanford, the Chaudhuri court concluded that college-educated
adults would not be unduly influenced by the prayers.110
2. Prayer at Military Colleges
For the Tanford and Chaudhuri courts, the age of the
students was the dispositive factor; because the students were
adults, religious speech at school events was not coercive.111 The
prayers at issue in those cases, however, were outside of a
105

Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1510.
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 505 U.S. at 312.
107
The nonsectarian prayers at issue were delivered by local clergy and were
substantively similar to those at issue in Lee. Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 985-86
(7th Cir. 1997).
108
Id. at 985. The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the prayers
violated the Lemon Test. In upholding the constitutionality of the prayers, the court
held that the invocation and benediction served the legitimate secular purpose of
solemnizing the occasion. Id. at 986.
109
Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 233 (6th Cir. 1997).
110
Id. at 237. The court also subjected the prayers to the Lemon Test. In doing
so, the court held that the prayers passed all three prongs of the standard. In particular,
the court stated that “[n]o reasonable observer could conclude that [Tennessee State
University], merely by requesting a moment of silence at its functions, places its stamp of
approval on any particular religion or religion in general.” Id. at 237-38.
111
Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1511.
106
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military context.112 Two federal circuit courts have struck down
religious activity at military colleges, however. In Anderson v.
Laird, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held as
unconstitutional a military regulation requiring cadets at the
U.S. Military Academy, U.S. Naval Academy, and USAF
Academy to attend religious services on Sundays.113 The
Anderson court rejected the regulation in three important
ways. First, the court refused to defer to military judgment on
the necessity of the regulations.114 While the court recognized
the military’s need to regulate its day-to-day operations and to
ascertain the essential characteristics of fitness for duty,115 it
affirmed its jurisdiction to decide issues of constitutional
significance.116 Second, although the court recognized that
individuals necessarily give up certain freedoms when they
enter the military, it held that enlistment could not be
conditioned on soldiers’ relinquishment of their religious
freedoms.117 Third, the court emphasized, “[T]he fact that
attendance at the military academies is voluntary does not
eliminate the possibility of coercion.”118 More significantly,
however, it was of no importance that some cadets could be
excused because of conscientiously held beliefs;119 as instituted,
the policy was per se unconstitutional.120
The Fourth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in
Mellen v. Bunting, where the panel rejected the notion that
citizens entirely forfeit their freedoms by entering the military.121
The issue in Mellen was the constitutionality of a “supper
prayer” at VMI.122 In a unanimous decision, the Mellen court held
that “VMI’s supper prayer exacts an unconstitutional toll on the

112

See Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d at 233; Tanford, 104 F.3d at 983.
Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Cadets were
required to attend Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish Chapel services. Failure to attend
one of these three services would result in punishment. Id.
114
Id. at 296.
115
Id. at 294-95.
116
Id. at 296.
117
Id. at 294. “To decline to apply the [Establishment] Clause absolutely . . . is
to create a loophole in the scope of its protection which the Supreme Court simply does
not admit.” Id. at 290.
118
Id. at 295.
119
Id. at 293.
120
Id. at 296.
121
See Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003).
122
Each day, prior to supper, a short prayer is given that gives thanks or asks
for God’s blessing. Id. at 362. VMI is a state-sponsored military college whose primary
goal is to prepare its cadets for military service. Id. at 360-61.
113
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consciences of religious objectors.”123 Central to its holding was
the coercive nature of VMI’s strict codes of conduct,124 which
were, in many respects, similar to military regulations.125 To
accomplish the school’s mission of training soldiers, VMI uses an
adversative method of training that is “predicated on the
importance of creating doubt about previous beliefs and
experiences in order to create a mindset conducive to the values
VMI attempts to impart.”126 As such, although the students in
question were not children, the court found that they were
“uniquely susceptible to coercion.”127 The Mellen court thus
rejected the rigidity of Chaudhuri and Tanford, which focused
strictly on the age of the students in question.128
Importantly, the Mellen court used the Lee coercion test
as its primary authority. While the Mellen court accepted
Lemon’s prevalence in Establishment Clause jurisprudence and
acknowledged that it has not been overturned, it concluded
that the coercion test should be the initial point of analysis in
the context of school prayer.129 In striking down VMI’s mealtime
prayer policy, the court thus emphasized the coercive nature of
the institution’s educational mission.130
III.

BALANCING ESTABLISHMENT AND FREE EXERCISE

The second religion clause of the First Amendment is
the Free Exercise Clause. Interpreted as a limitation on the
Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause states,
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”131 The
Free Exercise Clause’s essential purpose is to protect the
individual right to practice any religion or to choose not to
practice religion at all.132 The fundamental question implicated
123

Id. at 372.
Cook, supra note 3, at 16.
125
Mellen, 327 F.3d at 361.
126
Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 766 F. Supp. 1407, 1421 (W.D. Va.
1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
127
Id. at 371. Essential to the court’s conclusion was that the communal dining
experience was essentially obligatory. Id. at 372. All first year cadets are required to
attend supper at the mess hall and, although all other cadets can opt to eat elsewhere,
the only alternatives are vending machines and ordering pizza. Id. at 361 n.3.
128
Id. at 371.
129
Id. at 370-71.
130
Id. at 371.
131
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
132
Schweiker, supra note 38, at 7.
124
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by issues of religious speech is therefore whether the speech is
protected under the Free Exercise Clause or prohibited by the
Establishment Clause.133 In theory, the Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause work in tandem to promote the
common end of “religious freedom in the context of government
neutrality.”134 In practice, however, the two clauses have
competing and sometimes irreconcilable interests.135 Tension
between the two clauses arises when the government’s efforts
to avoid the endorsement of religion also prohibits private
religious practice.136 As a result, the disposition of a case
involving religious speech often turns on whether the court
frames the issue as an Establishment Clause controversy or a
Free Exercise controversy.137
A.

The First Amendment and the Military Chaplaincy

The tension between the Free Exercise Clause and the
Establishment Clause is exemplified by the existence of the
military chaplaincy. Exercising its power under Article I, Section
8 of the Constitution, Congress created a military to provide for
138
a national defense. In doing so, Congress also directed that the
military’s peace establishment consist of all organizations and
139
persons necessary to aid soldiers in battle. As part of this
directive, Congress has specifically authorized a military
140
chaplaincy to meet the religious needs of the members of the
141
142
U.S. Military. A funded division of the U.S. Military, the
military chaplaincy consists of three separate institutions: the
Chaplains Corps of the Army, the Chaplains Corps of the Navy,
143
and the Air Force Chaplains Service. The codes of conduct vary
somewhat by institution based on each service’s particular
mission, but all three groups function under the auspices of the
DOD, the agency given statutory authorization to implement the
133

Christian M. Keiner, Preaching from the State’s Podium: What Speech Is
Proselytizing Prohibited by the Establishment Clause?, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 83, 83 (2007).
134
Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1519.
135
Cook, supra note 3, at 25; Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1519.
136
Cook, supra note 3, at 25.
137
Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1519-20.
138
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
139
10 U.S.C. § 3062(d) (2006); Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 1985).
140
10 U.S.C. § 3073 (2006).
141
Id. § 3547 (2006); Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 226.
142
Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 229.
143
“Navy Chaplains also serve the Marine Corps, Coast Guard and the
Merchant Marine.” Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 2, at 116.
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144

chaplaincy. According to DOD Directive 1304.19(4.1), military
chaplaincies are “established to advise and assist commanders
in the discharge of their responsibilities to provide for the free
exercise of religion in the context of military service as
145
guaranteed by the Constitution . . . .” The directive further
states that military chaplaincies
[s]hall serve a religiously diverse population. Within the military,
commanders are required to provide comprehensive religious
support to all authorized individuals within their areas of
responsibility. Religious Organizations that choose to participate in
the Chaplaincies recognize this command imperative and express
willingness for their Religious Ministry Professionals (RMPs) to
perform their professional duties as chaplains in cooperation with
146
RMPs from other religious traditions.

The legal conflict over the existence of the military chaplaincy
thus centers on whether the government is simply allowing
soldiers to freely exercise their First Amendment religious
rights or whether, by creating and funding the military
chaplaincy, it has established a nonneutral preference for
religion in violation of the First Amendment.
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the
military chaplaincy’s constitutionality,147 the Second Circuit, in
Katcoff v. Marsh, upheld it as constitutionally valid.148 The
court’s first reason for doing so was based on the holding of
Marsh v. Chambers,149 a Supreme Court decision upholding the
constitutionality of a chaplain-led prayer before sessions of the
Nebraska legislature.150 The dispositive issue in Marsh was that
the prayer, having been performed for over one hundred years,
was a deeply rooted tradition in the state.151 Although the prayer
took a step towards government establishment of religion,152 the
Court noted that the practice was part of Nebraska’s social
fabric, which alleviated the Court’s fears about any proselytizing
144

Id.
DOD Directive No. 1304.19(4.1) (June 11, 2004).
146
Id. at 4.2.
147
Aden, supra note 7, at 189.
148
In that case, two Harvard law students, neither of which was a member of
the U.S. Military, challenged the existence of the Army chaplaincy as a federally
funded program under the Establishment Clause. Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 22425 (2d Cir. 1985).
149
See generally id. at 237-38.
150
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 783 (1983).
151
Id. at 790.
152
Id. at 795.
145
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effects.153 In Marsh, the Supreme Court thus adopted a historical
exception to the Lemon test.154 Relying on the reasoning of
Marsh, the Katcoff court noted a similar unbroken tradition of
chaplains in the military and concluded that the military
chaplaincy fit within that historical exception.155
The Katcoff court’s second reason for upholding the
military chaplaincy was deference to military judgment on the
issue.156 The court’s analysis acknowledged that the military
chaplaincy, viewed in isolation, would fail to meet the criteria
of Lemon.157 However, the court also held that the chaplaincy
must be viewed in the context of the War Powers Clause of
Article I, Section 8.158 Under the War Powers Clause, “[j]udges
are not given the task of running the Army” because the
military is a unique “community governed by a separate
discipline from that of the civilian . . . . [Thus, w]hile members
of the military are not excluded from the protection granted by
the First Amendment, the different character of the military
community and of the military mission requires a different
application of those protections.”159 The Katcoff court thus
stated that military decisions are presumptively valid and that
any doubt about the constitutionality of a military policy
should be treated with judicial comity.160 The permissibility of
the chaplaincy program, therefore, hinged on whether, after
considering practical alternatives, the institution was relevant
and necessary to a national defense.161 In the military’s opinion,
soldiers turn to religion to cope with the trauma of being
uprooted from their homes, thousands of miles away, to wage
war.162 According to the military, the chaplaincy is an integral
part of maintaining a national defense.163
Under the view of religion as an integral part of
national defense, chaplains provide a vital resource to
soldiers.164 Thus, as the Katcoff court’s third basis for upholding
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164

Id.
Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 232.
Id.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 233.
Id. at 233-34.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 237-38.
The Katcoff court stated:
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the chaplaincy institution, the court reasoned that, without the
chaplaincy, soldiers would be deprived of their Free Exercise
Clause right to freely practice religion.165 Because the military
requires soldiers to live on bases that are often far from their
religious communities and where organized worship is not
always available,166 the court reasoned the that Free Exercise
Clause actually requires the military to institute a chaplaincy
program.167 The provision of churches and chaplains at military
establishments, according the court, is therefore an
“appropriate accommodation between the two Clauses.”168
In its ruling, the Katcoff panel addressed the existence
of the program as an all-or-nothing proposition.169 As such, the
court’s holding was limited in several important ways. First,
the court assumed the chaplaincy met the requirement of
voluntariness because it determined that the chaplaincy
allowed soldiers to freely decide whether to worship without
the fear of discipline or stigma.170 Second, and more
importantly, the court explicitly stated that “[n]o chaplain is
authorized to proselytize soldiers or their families.”171 It would
seem, then, that Katcoff restricts chaplains to an inherently
passive role—tending to the spiritual needs of soldiers that
seek chaplain services on their own volition, rather than
actively influencing soldiers to change their religious beliefs.172
Ultimately, the court’s decision, while deferential to military
judgment on matters of national defense, also maintained

The chaplain’s principal duties are to conduct religious services (including
periodic worship, baptisms, marriages, funerals and the like), to furnish
religious education to soldiers and their families, and to counsel soldiers with
respect to a wide variety of personal problems. In addition the chaplain,
because of his close relationship with the soldiers in his unit, often serves as
a liaison between the soldiers and their commanders, advising the latter of
racial unrest, drug or alcohol abuse, and other problems affecting the morale
and efficiency of the unit, and helps to find solutions.
Id. at 228.
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172

Id. at 234.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Aden, supra note 7, at 197.
Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 231-32; Aden, supra note 7, at 194.
Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 228.
Aden, supra note 7, at 193.
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jurisdiction to decide matters involving the military chaplaincy,
which, as an institution, remains a government agent.173
B.

Defining Proselytization in the Context of the Religion
Clauses

In constitutional controversies involving religious
speech, a basic inquiry by courts is whether the religious
speech in question is a proselytizing message, as proselytizing
lies at the nexus of the two religion clauses.174 Like the military
chaplaincy, the question is whether the religious speech at
issue is simply a form of free exercise or whether it is an
impermissible form of government establishment of religion.175
This question is asked because many courts have essentially
adopted a “no proselytizing” rule.176 While there is some
consensus that the Establishment Clause is violated when
government-sponsored proselytizing occurs, the determination
of constitutionality ultimately turns on how the court frames
the legal issue.177 These determinations are complicated because
the Supreme Court has failed to define proselytization.178
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of
Virginia179 is a prominent example of a case in which the
Supreme Court did not believe that the delivery of a religious
message was proselytizing. There, the Supreme Court held that
it was constitutionally impermissible for the University of
Virginia to fund the printing costs of all its student
publications except the Christian newspaper.180 The denial of

173

Id. at 207; Richard D. Rosen, Katcoff v. Marsh at Twenty-Two: The Military
Chaplaincy and the Separation of Church and State, 38 U. TOL. L. REV 1137, 1178 (2007).
174
Keiner, supra note 133, at 83.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 83-85. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1983) (prayer
in question was not unconstitutional because there was no indication the prayer was
used to exploit, proselytize, or disparage any faith or belief); see also Van Orden v.
Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[T]here is nothing
unconstitutional in a State’s favoring religion generally, honoring God through public
prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a nonproselytizing manner, venerating the Ten
Commandments.” (emphasis added)); Baz v. Walters, 782 F.2d 701, 709 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Veteran’s Administration must assure existence of a chaplaincy does not create
Establishment Clause problems because of proselytizing); Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d
223, 228 (2d Cir. 1985) (“No chaplain is authorized to proselytize . . . .”).
177
Keiner, supra note 133, at 83.
178
Id. at 85.
179
515 U.S. 819 (1995).
180
The University, a public institution, chose not to fund the Christian
newspaper because of a University policy that prohibited funding a publication that
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funds to the Christian newspaper, the Court reasoned, was
improper even though the newspaper’s editors “committed the
paper to a two-fold mission: to challenge Christians to live, in
word and deed, according to the faith they proclaim and to
encourage students to consider what a personal relationship
with Jesus Christ means.”181 As Justice Souter noted in his
dissent, until Rosenberger, the Court had never “upheld direct
state funding of the sort of proselytizing published in [the
Christian newspaper] and, in fact, [had] categorically
condemned state programs directly aiding religious activity.”182
Rosenberger thus exemplifies the centrality of judicial framing
to the ultimate disposition of religious speech controversies: the
majority did not view the publication of the pamphlet as
proselytizing, but the dissenting members of the court did.
Despite the Supreme Court’s failure to adequately
define proselytization, some federal circuit courts have
developed proselytization as a legal principle.183 The Third
Circuit has stated that “[c]ontext is essential. . . . There is a
marked difference between expression that symbolizes
individual religious observance, such as wearing a cross on a
necklace, and expression that proselytizes a particular view.”184
The Fourth Circuit has also defined proselytizing as distinct
from the similar concept of passively advancing one’s own
religion.185 In one case, for example, a Fourth Circuit panel
stated that, “to ‘proselytize’ on behalf of a particular religious
belief necessarily means to seek to ‘convert’ others to that
belief, whereas to ‘advance’ a religious belief means simply to
‘forward, further, [or] promote’ the belief.”186 Justice Stevens
“primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate
reality.” Id. at 823 (internal quotation marks omitted).
181
Id. at 826. (internal citation omitted). The dispositive issue for the Court
was, however, the University’s regulation requiring public officials to scan student
publications for their religious content. Id. at 845. According to the Court, this action
denied a legitimate right to religious speech and ultimately risked “fostering a
pervasive bias [and] hostility [towards] religion.” Id. at 846. Further, the
Establishment Clause did not require the University to deny eligibility based on the
publication’s viewpoint; the University had distanced itself enough from the contents of
the publication so that there was no reasonable fear or appearance that the
government had endorsed the speech in question. Id. at 841-42, 861. In fact, to deny
the student publication money based on its religious content actually upset the notion
of government neutrality central to Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Id. at 846.
182
Id. at 874-75 (Souter, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
183
Keiner, supra note 133, at 101.
184
Walz v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271, 278-79 (3d Cir. 2003).
185
Keiner, supra note 133, at 102.
186
Wynne v. Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 300 (4th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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has also noted this distinction, albeit in dissent:
“Distinguishing speech from a religious viewpoint, on the one
hand, from religious proselytizing on the other, is comparable
to distinguishing meetings to discuss political issues from
meetings whose principle purpose is to recruit new members to
join a political organization.”187 The common analytical thread
of these opinions, including Rosenberger, is the extent to which
the government actor, as the purveyor of the religious message,
seeks to convert. Thus, as one author noted, “Proselytizing is
expressive activity which a reasonable observer would perceive
attempts to convert the audience from one religious belief, or
lack of a belief, to another religious belief, or lack thereof.”188
IV.

THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROSELYTIZATION AND
RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN THE U.S. MILITARY

Although courts have yet to apply the coercion test
outside the primary or secondary school context, coercion
analysis is ripe for Establishment Clause controversies in the
military context. Applying the coercion test, the incidents of
proselytization and religious discrimination, if true, are
unconstitutional.
A.

Adoption of Coercion Analysis for Military
Establishment Clause Controversies

The complexity of the Establishment Clause has
produced a variety of standards for evaluating the
constitutionality of a state law or action. These standards are
often applied inconsistently, sporadically, and sometimes, even
concurrently.189 In lieu of this complex patchwork, the coercion
test should be used to analyze all claims of religious
discrimination and proselytizing in the U.S. Military. The
coercion analysis is appropriate given both the inherently
coercive nature of military life and the prevalence of religious
discrimination claims in the U.S. Military. Further, the
application of the coercion test in these circumstances is

187

Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 128 (2001)
(Stevens, J. dissenting).
188
Keiner, supra note 133, at 104.
189
See supra Part II.A.
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entirely consistent with current Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.190
In attempting to establish the dividing line between
church and state, the Lemon Court emphasized that the
Establishment Clause’s purpose was to afford protection from
state sponsorship of religion, state financial support of religion,
and active state involvement in private religious activity.191
Similarly, the Lee Court stated that the Establishment Clause
was intended to prevent religious activity from becoming so
pervasive that it becomes, in effect, state-sponsored or statedirected.192 Although these standards are somewhat amorphous,
most claims of religious discrimination in the military
implicate the evils that, according to the Lemon and Lee
Courts, the Establishment Clause was intended to prevent.
The seminal case supporting the application of the
coercion test in Establishment Clause military controversies is
Mellen v. Bunting. In Mellen, the Fourth Circuit moved away
from the view of student age as the focal point in
Establishment Clause challenges to school prayers.193 In
contrast to Chaudhuri and Brand, the Mellen court focused on
the entire context in which the students’ claims were raised.194
The dispositive issue for the court was not the students’ age but
their enrollment in a school whose adversative-model
curriculum made them “uniquely susceptible to coercion.”195 By
rejecting the rigidity of a bright-line limitation based on age,
the Fourth Circuit moved towards a broad-based and thorough
analysis of government neutrality towards religion.
The analysis applied in Mellen not only examines the
constitutional issue through a more comprehensive perspective
than the Tanford and Chaudhuri approaches, but is consistent
with the holding in Lee. Although Lee was limited to primary
and secondary education,196 the decision did not answer the
question of whether a state action could coerce mature adults
190

See supra Part II.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
192
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
193
See Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 371 (4th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging
that “cadets are not children”).
194
Id. at 371-72.
195
Id. at 371.
196
Lee, 505 U.S. at 593. In fact, in Chaudhuri and Tanford, the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits used this reasoning to support their conclusion that mature adults
are not susceptible to coercion. Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 238 (6th Cir.
1997); Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 985-86 (7th Cir. 1997).
191
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in an educational setting.197 More importantly, in concluding
that primary- and secondary-school students are vulnerable to
coercion, Justice Kennedy used age merely as an indication of
susceptibility, not as a proxy for susceptibility.198 At no point in
Lee did Kennedy state that younger students are always
susceptible to coercion while older students are never
susceptible to coercion. The critical analytical point is thus the
degree to which those affected are vulnerable to forced religious
practices. While age may be an indication of vulnerability, it is
by no means dispositive.
Given the importance of context in Establishment
Clause challenges, the coercion test is also an appropriate
standard outside the school-prayer context. While Lee may be
limited to circumstances involving school prayer,199 its language
does not foreclose the possibility that other environments may
also be coercive. In penning the opinion, Justice Kennedy
actually spoke in broad terms about the constitutional
guarantees against government coercion of religion.200 In fact, a
critical aspect of Kennedy’s reasoning was his view that the
“objecting student had no real alternative to avoid” attending
the religious ceremony.201 Coercion analysis is thus ripe for
controversies involving the military given the uniquely coercive
nature of military socialization and the chain of command
hierarchy.202 This standard is especially appropriate in the
context of proselytizing. Proselytizing is coercive by its very
nature because its objective is to convert people from one
religious belief to another (or from nonbelief to belief) by
convincing them to follow the conveyed religious message.203

197

“We do not address whether [it] is acceptable if the affected citizens are
mature adults . . . .” Lee, 505 U.S. at 593.
198
See id.
199
“The sole question presented is whether a religious exercise may be
conducted at a graduation ceremony in circumstances where . . . young graduates who
object are induced to conform.” Id. at 599.
200
“Divisiveness . . . can attend any state decision respecting religion . . . .” Id.
at 587-88; “[T]he Establishment Clause . . . guarantees at a minimum that a
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its
exercise . . . .” Id. at 577.
201
Id. at 598.
202
See supra Part I.B.
203
Keiner, supra note 133, at 104.
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Application of Coercion Analysis to Proselytization in the
Military

Although coercion analysis is the proper test for
Establishment Cause controversies involving the military, the
alleged religious discrimination and proselytizing discussed in
Part I are not necessarily unconstitutional. When legal
controversies involve the establishment of religion in the military,
there are countervailing considerations of First Amendment Free
Exercise rights and deference to military decisions that implicate
national defense. There are also mitigating factors, such as
voluntariness.204 Taken together, these competing interests create
somewhat of a balance in controversies over religion in the
military. The military chaplaincy, for instance, is per se
constitutional despite the fact that it constitutes a form of statefunded organized religion.205 Reports of religious discrimination
and proselytization in the military, however, suggest that this
equilibrium has shifted in recent years.
A common argument against judicial intervention in
military policy is the deference historically given to military
judgment.206 For example, a critical aspect of the Second Circuit’s
decision in Katcoff, upholding the constitutionality of the
military chaplaincy, was that “military decisions reasonably
relevant and necessary to furtherance of our national defense . . .
should be treated as presumptively valid and . . . should be
resolved as a matter of judicial comity in favor of deference to
the military’s exercise of its discretion.”207 But this deference is
not absolute. In striking down a requirement that cadets at
military colleges attend Sunday religious services, the D.C.
Circuit noted that “while an individual’s freedoms may of
necessity be abridged upon his entrance into military life, there
is no authority for the point that his right to freedom of religion
is abolished.”208 More broadly, the court held that individual
204

See Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 233-34 (2d Cir. 1985).
See generally id.
206
Rabinowitz, supra note 19, at 925; see also Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 234;
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64-68 (1981).
207
Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 233-34.
208
The D.C. Circuit further noted:
205

Personal freedoms of conduct and appearance have been accommodated to
the military’s perceived need to establish procedures best suited to regulate
its day-to-day operations, duty assignments and call-up orders; to determine
a reservist’s discharge of his duties; to regulate physical appearance; and to
ascertain “the essential characteristics of fitness for duty.” This deference to
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constitutional freedoms cannot be sacrificed for the sake of
military interests.209 Thus, to the extent that chaplaincy
proselytization efforts or other questionable practices are
reasonably relevant to securing a national defense, these
practices are unconstitutional nonetheless.
The concept of voluntariness is related to this idea.
Couched in Katcoff’s rationale regarding judicial deference to
military decisions was the notion that individuals who enter
the military necessarily forgo freedoms they may have
otherwise enjoyed as regular citizens, such as the right to
travel whenever or wherever one wants.210 The Fourth and D.C.
Circuits, on the other hand, have explicitly stated that the
voluntary choice to enroll at military universities or to enlist in
the military does not abrogate constitutional guarantees.211
Essentially, the government may not condition enrollment or
enlistment on unconstitutional conditions.212 Thus, like judicial
deference to military discretion, the argument that soldiers
surrender their right to religious freedom when they enter the
military is tempered by constitutional guarantees.
As with judicial deference to military discretion and the
relinquishment of individual freedoms through voluntary
service, free exercise of religion in the military has its
limitations. Assuming the truth of the chaplaincy proselytizing
complaints, the chaplaincy program is a prime example of an
institution that runs afoul of the Establishment Clause despite
the right to free exercise.213 In light of the Second Circuit’s
holding in Katcoff that “no chaplain is authorized to proselytize
soldiers or their families,”214 it is clear that individual chaplains
have overstepped their constitutional authority by preaching to
military descionmaking has been justified by the military’s role, its mandate
to prepare for the waging war, and the necessity for our national security.
However, deference has inherent limitations which have also been fully
recognized in judicial decision.
Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 294-95 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
209
Id. at 295.
210
Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 233.
211
Anderson, 466 F.2d at 293; Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 372 (4th Cir. 2003).
212
Anderson, 466 F.2d at 293.
213
See Dobosh, supra note 45, at 1560 (arguing that “[t]he current practice of
offering chaplain-led prayers during mandatory, nonreligious, Army ceremonies
violates the Establishment Clause”).
214
Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 228; see also Rosen, supra note 173, at 1178 (noting
that the Katcoff decision did not “give the military leadership a blank check to
administer the chaplaincy or religious practices in the armed forces without regard to
the Establishment Clause”).
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cadets at military universities to convert fellow cadets.215
Chaplain-led prayers in the military and at military universities
have thus become analogous to the religious-oriented graduation
speeches at primary and secondary schools that the Supreme
Court has consistently deemed unconstitutional.216
Like chaplains, the actions of most other purveyors of
religious discrimination in the military are constitutionally
suspect under coercion analysis. Unlike chaplaincy policies,
however, the practices of other actors are unconstitutional not
simply because they seek to proselytize or discriminate based
on religious beliefs, but because they amount to overt coercion
in the context of military socialization and a strict chain of
command structure, where there is little tolerance for dissent.
Individual deviation from the group was impractical at best
when, for example, the USAF Academy head football coach
invoked Jesus’s name in the team locker room or a USAF
Academy professor required students to pray before taking
final exams.217 A soldier’s options are similarly limited during
religious ceremonies upon return from tours of duty and the
Naval Academy’s mealtime prayer.218
More ominous, however, are the actions of those higher
within the chain of command.219 In the military, a “subordinate
does not have the realistic ability to tell her or his commanding
officer that she or he is not interested in her or his religious
propaganda for fear of reprisals.”220 As a result, subordinates
are uniquely vulnerable to coercion. Any religious
discrimination or proselytization by superior officers, then,
should be unconstitutional.
The allegations of systematic peer ostracism and
harassment is the more difficult issue.221 Unlike institutional
discrimination or the proselytizing efforts of superior officers,
peer discrimination does not necessarily create a coercive
environment similar to those discussed so far. When soldiers
hold the same rank within the chain of command, the fear of
215

Weinstein Complaint, supra note 35, paras. 14-17.
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963);
Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
217
See supra Part I.A-B.
218
See supra Part I.A-B.
219
See supra Part I.A (detailing an alleged circumstance where a soldier was
threatened with sanctions by his superior because he was an atheist).
220
Schweiker, supra note 38, at 26.
221
See supra Part I.A.
216
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reprisal for rejecting religious propaganda is likely not the
same. But when peer groups within the military organize for
religious objectives, an essentially institutionalized form of
religious practice results. Peer-organized proselytization has
the potential to be just as coercive as formal institutionalized
religious practices.222 For this reason, it should not be tolerated.
CONCLUSION
State establishment of religion has long been a
convoluted area of constitutional law; this is particularly true
when controversies involve the military. Nevertheless, there is
significant precedent supporting the use of coercion analysis in
Establishment Clause controversies that involve the military.
Under the coercion test, if a person or group of people is
particularly susceptible to coercion, the state must forebear on
promoting action that is not neutral towards religion. Without
this protection, “citizens are subjected to state-sponsored
religious exercises, [and] the State [has disavowed] its own
duty to guard and respect that sphere of inviolable conscience
and belief which is the mark of a free people.”223
The extension of the coercion test to matters involving
the military is apt given the increasing concern in recent years
about religious discrimination and proselytization in the U.S.
Military. Using coercion analysis, it is evident that much of the
religious discrimination and proselytization discussed in Part I,
if true, is unconstitutional. To cure these constitutional
infirmities, the military should ensure that its universities,
superior officers, and overall practices promote religion only in
a neutral manner. This goal can be accomplished by
implementing nondiscrimination policies and regulations to be
enforced in conjunction with existing laws on religious
neutrality.224 Moreover, for military chaplains to practice within
222

In Santa Fe, where a student-elected prayer before football games was
ruled unconstitutional, the Supreme Court held that peer-organized proselytization can
have “the improper effect of coercing those present to participate in an act of religious
worship.” Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000).
223
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).
224
See DOD Directive No. 1304.19(4.2) (June 11, 2004). The directive states
that military chaplaincies:
[s]hall serve a religiously diverse population. Within the military,
commanders are required to provide comprehensive religious support to all
authorized individuals within their areas of responsibility. Id. Religious
Organizations that choose to participate in the Chaplaincies recognize this
command imperative and express willingness for their Religious Ministry
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the bounds of the Establishment Clause, they must serve as a
passive utility to soldiers who request their services and should
lead services only when attendance is truly noncompulsory.
More generally, the military should incorporate religious
components into military life only if it unambiguously
dissociates itself from the advancement of particular religions
and creates a zero-tolerance policy for coercive attempts to
achieve religious conformity.
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